quant-ph/0101012). This paper comes out of a consideration of Hilbert's Sixth Problem (http://euclid.unh.edu/∼ jjohnson/Hilbert.html), the axiomatisation of physics, as focussed by Wigner [8] in a famous discussion of the Problem of Quantum Measurement (arxiv.org/quant-ph/0502124).
Hilbert meant an axiomatisation of the physical concepts analogously to how he and others axiomatised the mathematical concepts of geometry. As he and others had eliminated the need for diagrams or intuition from plane geometry, so he hoped mathematicians could eliminate the need for physical intuition from physics. From this standpoint, which is one close to Wigner's (or at least he shows a sensitivity and awareness of it), Hardy's so-called axiomatisation is quite alien. We will focus on what Hilbert himself singled out as fundamental, the concept of physical probability.
This concept was salient in Hilbert's time, as the controversy between Boltzmann and Zermelo showed, but has become even more foundational in physics since 1925.
ON page 10, Hardy re-states his first axiom, which we quote:
'Axiom 1 Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion of times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value (which we call the probability) for any case where a given measurement is performed on an ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n becomes infinite.
What I want to claim here is more radical than any comment that he has chosen the 'wrong' interpretation of probability, or the 'wrong' axiomatisastion of Quantum Mechanics. This is simply not an axiom at all. (Dirac and von Neumann are much closer to Hilbert's spirit in this regard: at least each axiom of theirs, taken individually, is an axiom, even though when taken collectively, there are subtle problems which Wigner was aware of.) He has not specified which are the undefined, primitive terms, and which are the constraints being imposed on the usage of those terms by the axioms.
Is this a definition of probability? The term "limit" is undefined so it is not completely spelled out. In neither mathematics, nor physics, does the word 'limit', by itself, have a definite meaning.
Is probability an undefined term & this a physical axiom? It could, at first sight, be a physical axiom that
as the case may be-and is equal to the axiomatically primitive notion "probability." It has not, up to now, been thought that in the real world this limit did always exist. But let us adopt this as an axiom anyway. So let us assume that the axiom applies whenever such a function f exists. That is, whenever the physical set up he mentions exists, and whenever that physical set up yields a function f v 0 : N → {0, 1} as above, then the limit exists mathematically and agrees with the primitive notion of probability.
There are several major difficulties with this. Firstly, logic gates. It must be possible to combine the results of two independent sequences of measurements f Secondly, his other axioms do not allow us to say that f v 0 exists. In fact, they seem to rule out the existence of f v 0 .
Hence f v 0 cannot be a function even for given v 0 (except in special cases). But then the notion of "limit" is undefined. Thirdly, in mathematics probability is modeled by a measure, or else he should propose an alternative. He can't say what space his physical probability is a measure on, even in the classical physics case! Hardy exhibits a deep (although typical) conceptual confusion over whether he is axiomatising physical probability or mathematical probability. These are two separate problems even though once one is finished solving each one separately there remains the last task of showing that the one is a model for the other.
Mathematical statements are only a model for physical statements. For example, '3'
is not a primitive concept in mathematics, it is the set of all sets equipotent to . . . etc.
But the physical concept of '3' would, if axiomatised, not have the same logical structure at all. Then one checks that the physical axioms imply that then mathematical axioms are true when given the physical interpretation of the model.
The problem even for the limited context of classical mechanics and Kolmogoroffian probability was not really touched until von Plato's [7] important Ergodic Theory of (http://euclid.unh.edu/∼ jjohnson/Bellagainst.html). The whole idea of random variable shows this: its logical structure is, unfortunately, that the event is a deterministic function of something . . . an element of a measure space, a hidden variable. If he insists on using the usual notion of limit of a function (or sequence), then the physics must specify a mathematical object which is a function (or sequence), and he can't do this. IMHO, it is preferable to abandon that road and instead define by physical procedures a measure of total mass one in some other specified way. It does not really seem practical to model the idea of a sequence of measurements by a mathematical sequence. It is necessary to have the physical specification of that measure agree with experiment in the sense that the calculations, using the mathematical theory of probability, performed on that measure, agree to within experimental error with the observed probabilities which form the backbone of the experimental support for Quantum Theory. But we would not need to have a naive structure of 'events' and 'outcomes.' TEN THESES ON THE AXIOMATISATION OF PHYSICS 1.The experimental evidence, even today, still points to Dirac's axioms, except possibly the reduction of the wave packet.
2.The salient defect of these axioms is merely what Wigner pointed to, their dual overlap: a measurement can be analysed in two seemingly incompatible ways.
3.The foundations of physical probability are in a logically unsatisfactory state, so it is at least conceivable that fixing this could be part of the solution.
4.The frequency theory of probability is logically circular, as is well known (Kolmogoroff [4] , Burnside [2] , Littlewood [5] ). But it is so well-supported experimentally that what is needed is a logically unexceptionable theory of the physical meaning of a probability assertion that remains as close as possible to the frequency theory. Von Plato has provided one, and his suggestion can be improved. 9.An analysis of the physics of actual measurement apparatuses, e.g., amplification, would be likely to point the way to an answer. It would seem natural to suppose that the phenomena of measurement depend on the physics of measurement apparatuses! (Either that, or on the physics of interaction with the environment, but that should be a fall back in case the analysis of the physics of amplification is unsuccessful.) 10.A priori philosophical assumptions should not be allowed much weight against a theory that agrees with experiment. These include interpretations of physical probability, psycho-physical parallelism, monism, etc. On the other hand, J.S. Bell's requirements of logical coherence, stating clearly what is assumed and distinguishing it from what is proved, are not a priori philosophical assumptions, they are criteria needed before one even *had* a theory to compare with experiment at all in the first place.
Experimental result means *replicable*. Something experienced does not count as an experimental result unless it is replicable. Nature and Heisenberg have taught us that only the probabilities of our subjectively experienced conscious meter-readings are replicable, therefore only the probabilities are experimental results, and a theory that disagrees with our conscious perceptions does not thereby disagree with experiment.
